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In the mid-sixteenth century, Emperor Ogimachi (1517-1573) of Japan issued various 
imperial decrees to local provincial warlords who had established influence among their rivals. 
One such warlord who received an imperial decree, Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582), had just 
recently established control over Ise province. Ogimachi congratulated Nobunaga on his success, 
requested the restoration of valuable imperial lands in Owari and Mino, and asked for a donation 
to help restore court structures and support court ceremonies. Nobunaga could not resist the 
influence of an imperial decree and as such responded favorably to Ogimachi. Nobunaga ordered 
that various court lands be returned, thereby slowly recovering imperial revenue, although in 
small increments, from the devastation of the persistent warfare of the time period known as 
Sengoku.1 
 
The Problem 
Nobunaga responding to an imperial decree with respect and gifts is typical of the 
relationship between the military warlords known as daimyo during the Sengoku (1467-1568) 
era of Japanese history. The actions of the emperor and imperial court in relationship to the 
military warlords have been downplayed by historians through Sengoku and two following 
periods of Pacification (1568-1616) and Tokugawa (1603-1868). During these time periods, the 
emperor and court established a mutually beneficial relationship with the military warlords that 
often enabled the court to have more social and political influence than is typically believed by 
historians. 
 
1 Lee Butler, Emperor and Aristocracy in Japan: 1467-1680 Resilience and Renewal (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 146-47. 
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Historical Background 
The period of Sengoku was a time of frequent civil strife between local daimyo who were 
fighting for autonomy and influence in their respective small domains. Sengoku Japan was 
drastically different from previous periods in Japanese history as the near century of low-level 
warfare far outlasted all other military conflicts and oversaw the transfer of political power from 
the central administration to local autonomous zones.2 The Sengoku daimyo, attempting to 
establish influence and autonomy, cast confusion and doubt over the continued significance of 
one of the longest-lasting characteristics of Japanese culture: the emperor and imperial court. As 
these military warlords gained influence, the imperial court needed to project an influence that 
would allow self-preservation and thereby developed a pattern of issuing imperial decrees for 
donations or support and granting court rank. The imperial court’s status would also be 
challenged in the following historical periods, when the emperor and courtiers were thought to 
be under the dominance of nationally prominent warlords, notably Nobunaga, Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi (1536-1598), and members of the Tokugawa shogunate (1603-1868).  
 The Pacification period presented a different challenge to the emperor and court from the 
rising influence of three daimyo. Commonly seen to have initiated from Nobunaga’s march on 
Kyoto in 1568, the Pacification period is aptly named, as Nobunaga and his successors Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543-1616) brought substantial territory under their political 
control and “pacified” the country from the fractured warfare that had defined Sengoku. As 
Nobunaga and his successors established their country-wide influence, the emperor and court 
focused their efforts on appealing to just the three key leaders.  
2 Mary Berry, Hideyoshi (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 10. 
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Culminating with the establishment of a new military government under Tokugawa 
Ieyasu in 1603, the Tokugawa period ushered in a lasting peace that would define the future role 
of the imperial court. In 1615, Ieyasu promulgated the kuge sho-hatto, or laws for the court, 
which eliminated the court’s ability to grant rank without Tokugawa approval and seemingly 
ended the court’s ability to project influence through the methods it developed throughout 
Sengoku and Pacification.3 The court continued to adapt, however, and relying on a historical 
function as a legitimating body, the emperor and his court successfully retained significance that 
can be interpreted to have lasted through modern history.   
The Argument 
Each of these three periods in Japanese history, Sengoku, Pacification, and Tokugawa, 
presented challenges to the future significance of the emperor and imperial court. The political 
chaos of Sengoku and Pacification and the establishment of a new military government in 
Tokugawa introduced political rivals who could have dismantled the court. Contrary to the 
perceived notion of ineptitude in initiating significant action, the court not only outlasted these 
rivals, but projected a political and social influence that revitalized it in a prominent position as a 
cultural head of society.4 The Emperor and his court developed methods that drew on historical 
precedent such as the requests for support and the granting of court rank in an effort to establish 
a symbiotic relationship with the many local daimyo.  
Although the emperors of these periods are typically perceived by historians to have 
possessed limited ability to initiate significant action, some of their activities may have been 
overlooked. Early on in the Sengoku period, the imperial court was impoverished from warfare 
3 Herschel Webb, The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period (New York and London: Columbia 
University Press, 1968), 59-64.  
4 Butler, Emperor and Aristocracy, 287. 
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and destruction, though by the time of the formation of the Tokugawa government, the court had 
regained a significant portion of its wealth and was upheld by the new Tokugawa leaders as an 
important socio-cultural body. The imperial court achieved this success through multiple 
functions; relying on its historical function as a legitimizing body, the granting of court ranks and 
titles, issuing imperial decrees and requests for support that restored wealth and land of the court, 
and by consistently adapting to a changing political climate. Though the imperial court lacked 
the manpower or strength to compete with the military might of the daimyo, it could leverage its 
historical prestige and legitimacy to enhance its position.  A chronological review of the 
emperor’s actions during Sengoku, Pacification, and Tokugawa will reveal the methods by which 
the emperor and court adapted to the political challenges of the time. The reliance on granting 
court rank and title through a historical precedent of legitimization helped the court to flourish 
into the revered institution it is today. 
 
Literature Review  
The significance of the emperor and court as an active political and social unit from 
Sengoku-through-Tokugawa is a topic that still needs more attention. Earlier English studies of 
Sengoku through Tokugawa Japan focused almost entirely on the functions of the warriors, while 
research and literature on the imperial court was limited. As interpreted by several historians, 
there was a dominant theme of warrior manipulation of a weakening court to achieve national 
eminence. Herman Ooms 1985 work on Tokugawa Ideology exemplifies the view of the warriors 
holding advantage over the court. Ooms discusses the actions of Nobunaga towards the court as 
having “feigned submission, but in fact bypassed and controlled the emperor and shogun, thus 
Wallace 6 
 
subjugating them to the new authority with which he was investing himself.”5 In her 1982 work 
on Hideyoshi, Mary Elizabeth Berry indicated that Nobunaga had “chosen to stand outside the 
familiar governing frameworks and to remove himself from the court” and in so doing, indicated 
a “refusal to be integrated into powerless bodies that he sought to subordinate.”6 In his 1984 
work on sixteenth-century Buddhism, Neil McMullin likewise describes Nobunaga’s actions as 
having “used” the court by “borrowing the Emperor’s authority” for his own advantage.7  The 
actions of Nobunaga as inferred by these examples led to an attempt to overthrow the Emperor 
and replace imperial authority with his own, before his untimely death in 1582. While the 
Nobunaga example is the epitome of the early literature reviews, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu were 
also said to have manipulated the emperor’s position for their own personal gain. These 
historians clearly indicated the strong will of the warriors holding sway over the court. In recent 
decades, however, a new view of imperial influence has emerged.  
From the late 1980s through the new millennium, scholars incorporated new research and 
analysis of the significance of the Sengoku and Pacification imperial courts. Several historians, 
including Lee Butler, Bob Wakabayashi, and Norihito Mizuno have examined the imperial court 
more thoroughly with analyses of courtier, emperor, and foreigner primary sources during 
Sengoku through Tokugawa. Many of these historian’s works began to question the absolute 
supremacy of the warrior’s dominance and examined the role of the court more deeply.  
Butler’s 2002 major work on the imperial court is clearly indicative of a new emerging 
view in which “relations between the warriors and the court, including individual courtiers, were 
far more extensive than recent scholarship has suggested” and that “evidence that the unifiers 
5 Herman Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 28.  
6 Berry, Hideyoshi, 58.  
7 Neil McMullin, Buddhism and the State in Sixteenth-Century Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 
78-79. 
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‘used’ the court is neither as abundant nor as obvious as some have argued.”8 Bob Wakabayashi, 
in his 1991 article on the functions of the court, ascribes the granting of court rank and title as a 
“key reason” for its survival and projection of influence.9 Norihito Mizuno’s 2009 work 
discusses the Tokugawa regime’s classification of “Imperial authority as its source of 
legitimacy”.10 These historians have begun to change the discussion of warrior dominance to an 
imperial court that had the capability to establish influence and took initiative to secure some 
authority. The following analysis of the court’s actions during Sengoku, Pacification, and 
Tokugawa by emphasizing the realization of historical legitimacy will solidify the idea of an 
active rather than passive court.  
The argument will be presented chronologically from Sengoku up to the seventeenth 
century, and will chart the actions of the emperor and court that depict significant initiative. 
Examples of historical legitimization by pre-sixteenth century emperors will provide context for 
the historical precedents that the imperial courts of Sengoku through Tokugawa could draw 
from. Thereafter, how the Imperial court was able to legitimize the Sengoku and Pacification 
daimyo and Tokugawa shoguns through court rank and title and historical significance will 
provide the basis of an argument for an active court.  
 
Historical Legitimization  
 Prior to the sixteenth century, Japanese emperors existed within and sanctioned a 
secondary form of authority distinct from various warrior bodies. Even with the transfer of 
8 Ibid., 128.  
9 Bob Wakabayashi, “In Name Only: Imperial Sovereignty in Early Modern Japan,” Journal of Japanese Studies 17 
(Winter 1991): 30. 
10 Norihito Mizuno, “The Tenno in Early Modern Japanese Policy toward East Asia: The Case of Japanese-Korean 
Diplomatic Relations” Journal of Asian History 43 (2009): 63. 
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political authority from emperors to military overlords at the end of the Heian period (794-1185), 
under the Kamakura (1185-1333) bakufu regime, the Imperial court retained a function as a 
legitimizer of authority. In the words of Andrew Goble, the Kamakura bakufu did not seek 
“independence or total domination” but rather to “legitimize its prerogatives by agreeing…to an 
autonomy within the existing political and legal framework.”11 The bakufu never tried to 
eliminate or replace the imperial institution.12 The new warrior government, while establishing a 
degree of political control over matters of defense and land governance, still acted in accordance 
with the imperial framework and was legitimized by the imperial court. This style of governance 
continued with the following Muromachi shogunate until its demise within Sengoku. 
A central element that enabled the emperor to retain a function as a legitimizer through 
almost continuous transfers of political authority was the ideology of his divine descent. The 
Kojiki13, a central source to Japanese mythology, written in the eighth century, contains elements 
that claim the emperors of ancient Japan descended from a native sun goddess known as 
Amaterasu. The influential rulers who are believed to have commissioned the Kojiki, either 
Emperor Tenmu (631-686) or Empress Jito (645-703), had utilized this claim of descent from 
Amaterasu as justification of a divine right to rule.14  
Coupled with a formation of a Chinese modeled bureaucracy in the eighth century, the 
emperors established consolidated control through utilizing the mythology of divine descent.15 
The borrowed statecraft from China became known as the Ritsuryo system, under which was 
11Andrew Goble, “Medieval Japan,” in A Companion to Japanese History 2007, ed. William Tsutsui (Malden, 
Oxford, and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 49.  
12 Ibid., 49. 
13 Donald Philippi, trans. Kojiki (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1969). 
14 Douglass Fuqua, “Centralization and State Formation in Sixth-and Seventh Century Japan”, In Japan Emerging: 
Premodern History to 1850, ed. Karl Friday, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012), 106-107.  
15 Berry, Hideyoshi, 10. 
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constituted a basic body of law for criminal cases and civil and administrative matters.16 The 
combination of divine descent and the early Japanese development of centralization supported 
the installation of a “divine ruler” at the head of society, known as the Tenno or ‘Heavenly 
Sovereign’.17 As time passed into the Heian, Kamakura, and Muromachi periods, though the 
emperors lost complete political dominance in society, the belief of divine descent with the 
historical basis of the emperor as the head of an administrative body established a profound 
understanding of the emperor as a source of divine and practical legitimization among members 
of the aristocracy and warrior classes.18  
The divine legitimization of the emperor was made manifest in the emperor’s bestowal of 
court rank and title, which were relentlessly sought not only by courtiers, but by warriors of the 
ruling houses of the Kamakura and Muromachi regimes. The founder of the Kamakura 
shogunate, Minamoto Yoritomo (1147-1199), constructed his new warrior government on the 
basis of imperial legitimization by adopting the title of seii taishogun or “great general for 
pacification of the eastern barbarians” conferred by the emperor.19 Though Yoritomo and his 
successors could project political autonomy over land rights and governmental structures, they 
chose to accept legitimization of their authority from the Imperial house. A similar situation 
arose with the Muromachi shogunate, in which the founder, Ashikaga Takauji (1305-1358), 
received legitimization from the emperor with the acquisition of Shogun as well. Both of these 
military regimes held political authority, but acted in accordance with the historical eminence of 
the always reigning emperor. As can be construed from a change in military government 
multiple times, the legitimization efforts of the emperor could not prevent a civil war in 
16 Sakamoto Taro, The Japanese Emperor Through History (Tokyo: Shobi Printing, 1984), 23.  
17 Douglass Fuqua, “Centralization and State Formation”, 107. 
18 Bob Wakabayashi, “In Name Only: Imperial Sovereignty in Early Modern Japan,” Journal of Japanese Studies 17 
(Winter 1991): 5-6. 
19 Paul Varley, Imperial Restoration in Medieval Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 11-12.  
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Sengoku. The daimyo of Sengoku and beyond however, continued to adopt the historical 
precedent of the Kamakura and Muromachi warriors who chose to receive legitimization from 
the emperor and court through titles and their concomitant prestige.  
 
Sengoku Legitimization 
Sengoku daimyo sought court rank and title in order to legitimate their claim to authority 
over rivals within their domain and as a source of prestige. The titles that Sengoku daimyo 
received were typically honorary in nature, rather than functional offices with powers or 
responsibilities, but were significant because the emperor recognized the local military power 
and influence of the appointee. For example, Mori Motonari (1497-1571), the prominent daimyo 
of the Chugoku region of Western Japan, honored the succession of the imperial throne to 
Emperor Ogimachi in 1560 through offerings of rice for his banquet.20 In return, Ogimachi 
bestowed upon Mori the title of Mutsu no kami21, and also granted the office of Daizen-taifu22 to 
his eldest son Takamoto.23 Mori helped to support the enthronement of an emperor and in return 
was given a court title, which lent legitimacy to his provincial rule. Another example of this 
mutualism between the court and the warriors can be evidenced in the actions of Nobunaga’s 
father, Oda Nobuhide (1510-1551). In 1540, Nobuhide made a donation to the reconstruction 
efforts of the outer Ise shrine.24 As a reward for his efforts, Nobuhide was promoted to the post 
20Asao Naohiro and Marius Jansen, “Shogun and Tenno,” In Japan Before Tokugawa: Political Consolidation and 
Economic Growth, 1500 to 1650, ed. John Hall, Nagahara Keiji, and Kozo Yamamura (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1981), 253.  
21 Governor of Mutsu 
22 Master of the Palace Table 
23 Ibid, 253.  
24 Jeroen Lamers, Japonius Tyrannus: The Japanese Warlord Oda Nobunaga Reconsidered, (Leiden: Hotei 
Publishing, 2000), 41.  
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of provincial governor of Mikawa.25 Again, a daimyo’s legitimacy and prestige was enhanced 
from the symbolic, practical, and divine authority of the imperial court through title promotions 
and acted as a supplement to maintaining control and influence of their respective domains. The 
daimyo received the emperor’s blessing to strengthen their credibility and in so doing aided the 
imperial court’s own cultural significance and vitality. 
 The imperial court combined granting court rank and title with issuing decrees or 
appealing to the daimyo for support. As mentioned in the beginning of this study, Nobunaga 
responded favorably to a decree from Emperor Ogimachi and restored several court lands. The 
same can be evidenced from Nobunaga’s rivals during Sengoku. Though the imperial court did 
not directly order support through a decree as they had with Nobunaga, courtiers and the emperor 
appealed to various daimyo for the restoration of court lands. Daimyo who were victorious in 
regional battles and showed promise of becoming regional powers were supported by the 
emperor and court nobles.26 Those daimyo who appeared to be gaining influence and power 
were the first to receive messages and support from the imperial court. The imperial court’s 
messages of support or decrees to restore imperial land served as reminders that the emperor and 
court could often not be ignored. A similar pattern of granting court rank and targeting influential 
daimyo continued into the Pacification period.  
 
 
25 Ibid., 41.  
26 John Hall, “Hideyoshi’s Domestic Policies,” In Japan before Tokugawa: Political Consolidation and Economic 
Growth: 1500 to 1650, ed. John Hall, Nagahara Keiji, and Kozo Yamamura, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 197.  
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Legitimization of Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi 
 The imperial court continued its efforts of legitimating daimyo through court rank and 
title in the Pacification period, however, its efforts focused on the three unifiers. Nobunaga’s 
military exploits were rewarded by appointment to high imperial office.27  By 1575, Oda 
Nobunaga had established effective control over his regional domain, had already marched his 
forces into Kyoto, and appeared to be Japan’s dominant military lord.28 The proximity of 
Nobunaga’s forces and influence would have made the imperial court uneasy. The court needed 
to rely on its legitimizing function to help acquire Nobunaga’s support.  
 Nobunaga’s first appointment to Imperial office had come in 1574 when Emperor 
Ogimachi granted him Junior Third Rank, a middle rank with some renown.29 Following this 
initial entrance into court nobility, Nobunaga was appointed minister of the center in 1576 and 
minister of the right in 1577.30 With each of these appointments, Nobunaga offered gifts of gold 
to the court and helped to restore its war-torn finances. Throughout these years, Nobunaga 
continued to gain power and as such the imperial court continued to offer rank and title in order 
to keep Nobunaga within its influence.   
On practical terms, Nobunaga’s membership in the court aided the court’s finances 
greatly. During Nobunaga’s first appointment year of 1575, he instructed that new grants of land 
be given to many of the court nobles and even cancelled many of the courtiers debts from the 
Sengoku era. The grants of land Nobunaga gifted the courtiers ranged from 50 to 300 koku, or 
27 George Elison, “The Cross and the Sword: Patterns of Momoyama History,” In Warlords, Artists, and 
Commoners: Japan in the Sixteenth Century, ed. George Elison and Bardwell L. Smith, (Honolulu: University Press 
of Hawaii, 1981), 76.   
28 Lamers, Japonius Tyrannus, 109-110. 
29 Webb, Japanese Imperial Institution, 50. 
30 Butler, Emperor and Aristocracy, 155. 
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units of rice up to 1,000 given to the emperor himself.31 Nobunaga also raised taxes in the capital 
city of Kyoto during 1577, restored portions of the imperial palace, as well as operated toll 
barriers, of which many of the funds went to benefit the courtiers and emperor.32 Nobunaga’s aid 
to the finances and vitality of the court during these years coincided with his acquisition of court 
title. The emperor and court were willing to bestow political legitimacy upon Nobunaga, 
enhancing its own prestige as a legitimizer, and also pragmatically received repairs and 
donations in return.  
Nobunaga’s gift giving should be seen as being initiated by the imperial court. An 
imperial letter sent to Nobunaga in 1557 from Emperor Go-Nara (1495-1557) in which the 
imperial court acknowledged Nobunaga’s increasing status and requested land holdings in Owari 
and Mino to be restored to the court, suggests that the court requested some if not a majority of 
the gift giving and assistance from Nobunaga. In response to Emperor Go-Nara’s letter, 
Nobunaga restored the court lands, and continued with a pattern of instructing his vassals to 
occasionally relinquish historically court-related lands.33 As can be determined from current 
sources, no imperial letters or missives were sent to Nobunaga before 1557 and Nobunaga did 
not initially send favors or gifts to the court until after 1557. Nobunaga’s repairs, donations, and 
acceptance of rank and title continued until 1578.    
 Nobunaga’s climb up through the court ranks ended in 1578 when he resigned all of his 
court titles and rank.34 Some prominent historians have declared that Nobunaga’s resigning of 
court rank meant that he intended to break away from the historical pattern of imperial 
legitimization and create his own sphere of legitimate authority. In fact, Herman Ooms surmises 
31 Butler, Emperor and Aristocracy, 149. 
32 Neil McMullin, Buddhism and the State, 77-78. 
33 Berry, Hideyoshi, 39-40. 
34 Ibid., 58. 
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that Nobunaga was “secure and shrewd enough…to reject limitation that an outside legitimizing 
authority imposes on power” and that he “sought to use his power to circumscribe existing 
authority, which could only be done if he created for himself his own legitimacy without any 
reliance on traditional authority”.35 Mary Berry writes in a similar fashion by stating “Nobunaga 
had chosen to stand outside familiar governing frameworks and to remove himself from the 
court”.36 These historians overlook Nobunaga’s true intentions, however, and are too quick to 
indicate signs of a weakened imperial court.  
 Nobunaga’s intentions of resigning court rank may be revealed by interpreting his letter 
of resignation in 1578.  
Although the present posts have been graciously bestowed on me, my deeds of conquest remain 
unfinished. Therefore, I desire to resign from this office. Once the eastern and northern 
barbarians are destroyed and the southern and western savages subdued-in short, when the 
myriad lands are at peace and the four seas tranquil-I will once again follow imperial order and 
accept high position. I will be the court’s chief support and most loyal minister. Accordingly, I 
entrust to you a petition: that these important posts be conveyed to my heir, Nobutada.37 
  
According to this letter, Nobunaga appears to not want to surpass the court’s authority as 
the other historians have mentioned and intend to resume his posts once his military conquests 
were complete. Nobunaga even stated that he was the court’s most loyal and supportive servant. 
The fact that Nobunaga allowed for the option of his son to assume his former court rank reveals 
that Nobunaga would continue to intertwine himself and his family with the imperial court. 
Nobunaga’s action of returning court titles was not without historical precedent, as other daimyo 
35 Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology, 29. 
36 Berry, Hideyoshi, 58. 
37 Kanemikyo-ki, Tensho 5/7/12 (1577), As cited in Lee Butler, Emperor and Aristocracy in Japan: 1467-1680 
Resilience and Renewal (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 155. 
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had done the same before him.38 The act of returning titles and rank had often been an act of 
deference or respect to the Emperor, rather than an attempt to establish personal legitimization. 
From acting as a chief supporter of the Imperial court through his donations, repairs, and 
reaffirmation of court lands, Nobunaga would have been acting out of character to suddenly plot 
an overthrow of the court.  Unfortunately, Nobunaga’s abrupt death in 1582 and limited sources 
prevent a clear representation of his intentions in resigning court rank; however, there is not 
enough evidence to indicate a sense of wanting to remove the court from influence.39 
 Nobunaga’s successor, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, was also granted court rank and title. 
Following the death of Nobunaga, the imperial court lost its strongest ally and needed to focus 
on another daimyo who could lend credibility to its historical functions. Having quickly defeated 
Nobunaga’s traitorous vassal, Mitsuhide Akechi (1528-1582), and consolidated control over 
many of Nobunaga’s former territory and supporters, Hideyoshi became the clear successor to 
Nobunaga’s legacy. The imperial court understood Hideyoshi’s new power and so bestowed 
upon him the fifth rank and the title of General of the Palace Guards of the Left in 1582. In a 
similar pattern to Nobunaga, the more success Hideyoshi enjoyed in battle against the remaining 
daimyo, the higher Hideyoshi would climb in the court ranks, culminating with his ascendency to 
the post of Kanpaku or regent in 1585.40 The historical post of regent was unprecedented for a 
warrior to hold, and shows how far the daimyo and Imperial court relationship had risen. The 
imperial court had presented a strong legitimization of Hideyoshi’s political control and likewise 
received the support of Hideyoshi through his desire for court rank.  
38 Bob Wakabayashi, “Imperial Sovereignty”, 38. 
39 Butler, Emperor and Aristocracy, 156-157. 
40George Elison, “Hideyoshi, the Bountiful Minister,” In Warlords, Artists, and Commoners: Japan in the Sixteenth 
Century, ed. George Elison and Bardwell Smith (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press), 230-231. 
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Hideyoshi enthusiastically accepted court rank and title. Hideyoshi’s enthusiasm derived 
from his humble origins as a peasant and a desire to remove himself from his restricting 
background. With every title and rank that Hideyoshi accepted, he became more dignified in the 
eyes of his vassals and enemies.41 Court rank could instill in Hideyoshi, due to his barren 
beginnings, a much more prominent legitimacy than even Nobunaga achieved. Also contributing 
to Hideyoshi’s desire for court rank was the ability to recommend his subordinates for 
promotions. Several instances of petitioning the court for the promotion of vassals under 
Hideyoshi, such as Maeda Toshie (1538-1599) being raised from the post of sakon’e no gon 
shosho42 to dainagon43, or Ukita Hidie (1573-1655) to the post of sangi ukon’e no chujo44, 
reveal Hideyoshi’s intent of inserting the warriors under his command into the court.45 By 
allowing his subordinates to receive court honors, Hideyoshi could secure a personal debt of 
respect from warriors who had so eagerly overthrown their superiors in the Sengoku era. 
Hideyoshi could help prevent the threat of revolt by securing court posts for those daimyo 
serving underneath him. Hideyoshi’s ready acceptance of court rank and title further aided the 
court’s finances as well. 
 In a similar fashion to Nobunaga, Hideyoshi also made gifts and donations to the court 
during the years in which he took up court rank. In 1585, Hideyoshi conducted a restoration of 
the imperial palace as Nobunaga did before him and was granted a promotion to the second rank 
among the court aristocracy.46 When Hideyoshi was invested with the title of kanpaku, he 
conferred many lands and estates upon the imperial court including 1,000 koku of land to a high 
41 Berry, Hideyoshi, 188. 
42 Provisional Lesser Captain of the Palace Gates of the Left  
43 Major Counselor 
44 Consultant Middle Captain of the Palace Guards of the Right  
45 Ibid, 179-180. 
46 Ibid., 178.  
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ranking courtier and 100-500 koku of land to lesser courtiers.47 The imperial court again 
benefited financially from granting court rank upon the current authoritative daimyo and 
received lands, repairs, and donations in return, along with the increased legitimization of its 
function as a social and cultural historical unit. After Hideyoshi’s death in 1589, a power vacuum 
resulted in a newly established political order in the Tokugawa Era.  
 
 
Imperial Transformation under Ieyasu    
 The successor of both Nobunaga’s and Hideyoshi’s legacies, Ieyasu Tokugawa was also 
the recipient of imperial court honors as he gained influence. At the time of Hideyoshi’s death, 
only his young child Hideyori (1593-1615) held any claim to his succession as military lord. 
Tokugawa Ieyasu, however, took advantage of Hideyori’s age and began to consolidate support 
for his own legitimacy as a successor to Hideyoshi. Ieyasu’s drive to replace Hideyoshi 
culminated with his victory in the battle of Sekigahara in 1600 against forces that were still loyal 
to the Toyotomi heir. Ieyasu’s victory at Sekigahara firmly established his control and authority 
as the next political hegemon.48  
           The new warrior authority resulted in the imperial court focusing its legitimizing efforts 
on Ieyasu, as it had with Hideyoshi and Nobunaga before him. Ieyasu, however, was granted the 
title of shogun, a title that lay claim to authority as a military overlord as the Kamakura and 
Ashikaga shoguns from before Sengoku. Ieyasu utilized his new authority as shogun to establish 
a regime that brought peace to a country that had been at almost constant war since 1467.  Ieyasu 
47 Butler, Emperor and Aristocracy, 150. 
48 Asao Naohiro, “Shogun and Tenno”, 259. 
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and the Tokugawa Shogunate challenged the political posture of the imperial court by 
intervening with the court’s historical authority to grant court rank and title.  
 Before conferring the title of shogun, the imperial court recognized Ieyasu’s position as a 
new military authority by granting him court rank and title, in a similar fashion to Nobunaga and 
Hideyoshi, along with the Sengoku damiyo before them. For instance, Ieyasu was made Minister 
of the Right in 1603.49 The imperial court displayed the same initiative of granting prestige to the 
current military overlord as it had in Sengoku and Reunification. After Ieyasu became shogun, 
however, the court was no longer able to rely on granting court rank alone to project influence. 
Though Ieyasu at first accepted some limits of court authority through accepting court 
rank and title, he quickly sought to define his regime under different terms. Ieyasu focused on 
establishing a military regime that would survive after his death. Ieyasu’s focus on the court 
culminated with the promulgation in 1615 of the Kinchu narabi ni kuge shohatto or Regulations 
for the Emperor and Nobility. Two of the major points of the Kuge shohatto are outlined below. 
[1] “The emperor is to be engaged in the arts, the first of which is scholarship. If he is negligent 
in learning he will be unable to illuminate the ancient way; there has yet to be [an unlearned 
emperor] who has ruled well, in peace. The Chen-kuan cheng- yao (Kanpyo era 889-897) is a 
lucid, instructive work. Even if one does not examine the morals and history of the Kanpyo 
yuikai one must certainly learn well the [teachings of the] Ch'un-shu ch 'ih yao. The composing 
of waka began with emperor Koko (830-887) and continues to this day. Though it consists 
49 Webb, Japanese Imperial Institution, 52. 
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merely of beautiful expressions, it is our country's art; it should not be abandoned. As written in 
the Kinpisho (1221), [the emperor's] primary efforts should be directed to the arts.”50 
[7] “Offices and ranks of the military lords must be kept separate from those of the courtiers.”51 
The seventh law of the Kuge Shohatto prevented the imperial court from granting the court titles 
that significantly aided its influence through Sengoku and Pacification, while the first law 
attempted to define the role of the emperor in Tokugawa society. Ieyasu’s reasons for 
proclaiming the elimination of court granted titles and honors of warriors reveal the extent to 
which the court’s influence could reach. Ieyasu was likely afraid of the court continuing to grant 
titles to daimyo beneath him or those who he had recently subjugated. In so doing, the imperial 
court could lend its legitimating authority to a daimyo other than Ieyasu. Ieyasu knew that a 
daimyo backed by the court could potentially be a threat to his newly established shogunate. If 
the imperial court could not influence politics and was weak during the preceding century, then 
surely Ieyasu would not have felt a strong need to control the appointments of court rank.  
Some historians have indicated that these two laws forcibly limited the range of emperor 
and courtier activities in an attempt to curb their political influence and reduce the image of 
imperial significance. John Whitney Hall indicated that “the opportunity for the Tenno to 
manipulate the warrior elite through appointment to court office was forever destroyed” and that 
the laws resulted in the “achievement of control over the court”.52 Hall refers to the first law as 
confining the emperor to a single symbolic function and removing the emperor from the sphere 
of political influence. While these two laws did indeed prevent the court’s granting of rank due 
50 Kinchu Narabi Ni Kuge Shohatto, As cited in Lee Butler, “Tokugawa Ieyasu’s Regulations for the Court: A 
Reappraisal” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 54 (Dec 1994): 532. 
51 Ibid., 532. 
52 Asao Naohiro, “Shogun and Tenno”, 263-64. 
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to a risk of political interference, they were not meant for Ieyasu to subjugate or diminish the 
court. 
 The Kuge shohatto reaffirmed the importance of the imperial court to Japanese society 
and ensured its continued influence on Japanese social and cultural realms. The first law, while 
seen as limiting, was actually based on Ieyasu’s historical knowledge of the emperor’s 
legitimacy to reign. The three works of literature that the first law mentions were manuals on the 
functions of an ideal ruler.53 The seventh law was Ieyasu’s attempt to establish a hierarchy 
among his daimyo subordinates that would aid the establishment of a lasting peace, by 
preventing the court from granting prestige to warriors beneath his status. Other articles within 
the Kuge shohatto attempted to define the functions and practices of court society, through 
seating arrangements, promotion requirements, and ceremonial affairs. If Ieyasu and Tokugawa 
policy desired the diminished status of the imperial court, it would not have needed to confirm 
the imperial court’s status. Instead, Ieyasu’s proclamations on the court established a new kind of 
legitimacy for the court that combined with its already extensive historical legitimacy.  
 
Imperial Legitimacy Post Ieyasu  
In the years following Ieyasu’s death in 1616, the imperial court could lay claim to a 
legitimacy from its historical functions and longevity, as well as documented legitimacy 
stemming from Ieyasu’s regulations. Ieyasu’s shogun successors also regarded the imperial court 
as a source of legitimacy for the bakufu’s control. The third shogun, Iemitsu (1604-1651), 
explained the Tokugawa legitimacy as being connected to Emperor Seiwa (850-878), through the 
53 Butler, Emperor and Aristocracy, 209.  
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Toshosha Engi, a text dedicated to Ieyasu’s memorial.54 The Tokugawa shoguns of the 
seventeenth century, while holding effective political control, perceived their claim to authority 
by the legitimation of the emperor and imperial court.  
 Tokugawa intellectuals of the seventeenth century also perceived the shoguns’ claims to 
authority as being legitimated by the emperor, through the imperial court’s historical and sacred 
authority. The intellectuals drew upon the emperor’s divine authority as inspiration for his place 
in society. Yamaga Soko (1622-1685), a Tokugawa Confucian philosopher and writer, discussed 
the hierarchy of shogun and emperor.55 Soko’s Buke jiki, which interpreted the role of the 
various shogunates in Japanese history, acted as a definition of the relationship between the 
emperor and Tokugawa bakufu. A key idea of the Buke jiki is as follows: 
The Imperial Court is the Forbidden Precinct. Happily, the line descended from Amaterasu has 
possessed hereditary authority for countless generations. Accordingly, even though a military 
general has grasped power and directs government and letters within the four seas, this is 
nevertheless for the reason that he has been commanded to oversee all state affairs on behalf of 
the Imperial Court, and his serving of the Imperial Court diligently, without the slightest 
negligence, is in accordance with the Great Propriety obtaining between lord and subject.56 
 
Soko’s ideas here present a clear hierarchy that establishes the emperor and court as the supreme 
body of Japanese society, although the shogun performs political functions. Soko asserted that 
the Tokugawa shoguns gained their legitimacy from the emperor and imperial court.  
 Another intellectual of the Tokugawa period of the seventeenth century whose ideas 
aided the legitimacy of the imperial court, was a related member of the Tokugawa family no less: 
54 Norihito Mizuno, “The Tenno in Early Modern Japanese Policy toward East Asia: The Case of Japanese-Korean 
Diplomatic Relations” Journal of Asian History 43 (2009): 63. 
55 David Earl, Emperor and Nation in Japan (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), 38-43. 
56 Buke Jiki, Book XLV, As cited in David Earl, Emperor and Nation in Japan (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1964, 43-44. 
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Tokugawa Mitsukuni (1628-1701). Mitsukuni began work on Dai nihon shi, which conveyed the 
ideology of imperial loyalism and legitimacy. Dai nihon shi was, structurally, a biography of 
emperors and shoguns throughout Japanese history, and especially made reference to support and 
admiration for the past emperors. The fact that the Tokugawa shoguns allowed the Dai nihon shi 
to be published reveals their interpretation that they were also loyalists to the imperial court and 
received its legitimization.57 The backing of political commentators and the shoguns themselves, 
provided the imperial court with a sense of importance and influence that may have been 
attenuated with the loss of the ability to grant court rank. The ideology that provided the backing 
of the imperial court came from Ieyasu’s affirmation of the court’s socio-cultural importance as 
well as its historical legitimizing functions that enabled perseverance through Sengoku and 
Pacification. 
 
Conclusion 
 The emperor and imperial court of Japanese society has gone through sweeping changes 
in political structure to continue to survive today as an important element of Japanese culture. 
Throughout the historical periods of Sengoku, Pacification, and the seventeenth century of 
Tokugawa Japan, the court’s role and function in society was uncertain. Several factors, from 
almost continuous warfare, poverty, and military warlords rising and falling from seats of 
authority brought into question whether the imperial court would continue to function as a 
political and socio-cultural force. The court was also sometimes interpreted by historians as 
nothing more than a “tool” for the warriors to use in their quest for dominance. The imperial 
57 John Brownlee, Japanese Historians and the National Myth, 1600-1945: The Age of the Gods and Emperor Jinmu 
(Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press, 1997), 29-33. 
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court successively projected its influence over military rivals through the manipulation of court 
rank and title, along with a historical legitimization that oftentimes commanded respect and 
admiration.  
 Rank and title were given to various provincial daimyo of Sengoku, to Nobunaga and 
Hideyoshi during Pacification, and to Ieyasu during the early period of Tokugawa Japan. The 
imperial court could rely on its ability to legitimize the authority of warring daimyo, to preserve 
a historical initiative as a divine cultural authority. The possibility of receiving rank and title, 
thereby establishing credibility over their domains, compelled daimyo to send gifts and 
donations to the court, as well as support the court’s functions in society. Each of the leading 
daimyo of the times sought the acquisition of court rank.  
 By the time of Tokugawa Japan, when granting rank and title was removed from the 
court’s abilities, the previous two centuries had ingrained a respect for the imperial institution 
among the members of the Tokugawa shogunate and populace. Rank and title initiatives by the 
imperial court during Sengoku and Pacification had already solidified the court’s place in society 
as a beneficiary of the military overlord. Even though the court could no longer grant rank to 
members of the warrior class, the shoguns still relied on historical precedent for legitimization of 
their authority by the imperial court.  
 Granting court rank and title, along with historical precedent, provided the imperial court 
with the tools to ensure survival during Sengoku, Pacification, and Tokugawa. These same 
measures provided the imperial court with an ability to initiate action that contradicts a theme of 
weakness and frailness. By the end of the seventeenth century, the imperial court was certain to 
be a permanent feature of Japanese society that legitimized the current political ruler of Japan 
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and represented the cultural sphere of society. The imperial line continues to survive today, due 
in part to the efforts of Sengoku, Pacification, and Tokugawa emperors and courtiers.  
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